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9Attempt to Commit Genocide
Jens David Ohlin
1. Introduction
 e Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Genocide Convention’ or ‘Convention’) explicitly 
penalizes attempt to commit genocide,¹ and the statutes for the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY)² and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)³ also confer upon the two ad hoc Tribunals jur-
isdiction over attempt to commit genocide. Despite the presence of these provi-
sions in these key instruments, however, the oﬀ ence is burdened by theoretical 
confusion.
 e basic dilemma underlying the crime of attempt to commit genocide stems 
from the fact that no one knows for sure what it means. In national criminal 
law the category of attempts is by deﬁ nition an inchoate category, in the sense 
that attempted oﬀ ences penalize criminal actions that are never completed.⁴ 
Consequently, attempt to commit genocide is presumably an oﬀ ence where the 
¹ Genocide Convention, Art. III(d).
² ICTY Statute, Art. 4(3)(d).   ³ ICTR Statute, Art. 2(3)(d).
⁴ See P.H. Robinson, Criminal Law (New York: Aspen Publishers, 1997), 611.
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genocide itself is never completed. However, the crime of genocide has, in a sense, 
an inchoate component already built into it, since the crime does not require the 
successful destruction ‘in whole or in part’ of an ethnic group or another group 
protected by Article II of the Genocide Convention.⁵ Indeed, the crime of geno-
cide simply requires the intent to destroy a protected group and the actus reus of 
the oﬀ ence does not require the actual destruction of the group.⁶ In one sense, 
this suggests that all crimes of genocide are better characterized as attempt to 
commit genocide.⁷ For whatever reason, however, the statutory deﬁ nitions of the 
crime do not make this clear.⁸
 is theoretical anxiety has led to confusion among scholars about the basic 
understanding of attempt to commit genocide and whether it means that the 
genocide itself is attempted but not completed, or whether the underlying oﬀ ence 
is attempted but not completed. Consequently, on the one hand, one leading 
commentator concludes that ‘[w]hat can be attempted in relation to genocide is 
the underlying oﬀ ence (killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, etc.)’ and 
that given the ‘limited resources at the disposal of the Oﬃ  ce of the Prosecutor, it 
is unlikely that the prosecutor of either ad hoc Tribunal will ever brings charges 
of attempt to commit genocide.’⁹
However, not everyone is in agreement that attempt to commit genocide 
refers to the underlying oﬀ ence. Another commentator concludes that there is 
no general attempt provision in either the ICTY or ICTR Statutes because ‘[t]
his is quite logical, as there is hardly a need to prosecute attempt when a tribunal 
is set up ex post facto.’¹⁰ In other words, since at the moment in time when the 
⁵ See A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, (2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 134 (discussing the question of how many members of an ethnic group must be killed to 
constitute genocide).
⁶ See, e.g., W.A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 154–5; Cassese, supra note 5, at 133.
⁷ Indeed, attempt was not even mentioned in the International Military Tribunal (IMT) 
Charter governing the Nuremberg trials. However, the broad deﬁ nition of criminality oﬀ ered 
by the Charter suggests an inchoate element that encompasses attempt liability. It is for this rea-
son that Eser suggests that attempt was implicitly covered by the broad deﬁ nition of crimes that 
included punishment for preparatory acts. See A. Eser, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility’, in A. 
Cassese, P. Gaeta and J.R.W.D. Jones (eds),  e Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), Vol. I, at 807 (noting that crimes against 
peace in Article 6(a) of the Nuremberg Charter included liability for acts falling short of comple-
tion such as preparation and planning). Eser concludes that ‘it appears fair to say that, prior to the 
Rome Statute, neither a duly generalized nor an adequate concept of attempt as a category of crim-
inal responsibility of its own was in force’. Ibid. at 808.
⁸ See Article 6 of the ICC Statute: ‘For the purpose of this Statute, “genocide” means any of 
the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, 
or religious group, as such . . . killing members of the group’; Article 25(3)(f) (‘attempts to commit 
such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means of a substantial step, but the 
crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of the person’s intention’).
⁹ See G. Mettraux, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 257. Mettraux argues that the genocidal mens rea is the same for attempted genocide 
as it is for genocide proper.  e only diﬀ erence is that the underlying oﬀ ence is frustrated.
¹⁰ W.A. Schabas, supra note 6, at 281.
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Security Council enacted both the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, both the Rwandan 
and Yugoslavian tragedies had already occurred, it was hardly necessary for the 
Security Council to include jurisdiction to try crimes associated with attempted 
but not completed genocides.
 ere is no deﬁ nitive judicial resolution of this doctrinal quandary for the 
simple reason that there have been no direct prosecutions for attempt to com-
mit genocide, thus escaping the judicial need to directly clarify this confusion.¹¹ 
Nor is their likely to be one in the foreseeable future.¹²  ere is no reason—in 
theory—that one could not conclude that both versions of attempt are plausible 
oﬀ ences, though it is best to keep them conceptually distinct, as each may have 
diﬀ erent legal requirements. Furthermore, in assessing whether any given statu-
tory scheme criminalizes attempt to commit genocide, it is imperative that one 
make clear which version one is considering. We must keep this distinction in our 
minds as we proceed with the foregoing analysis.
To date, no scholar has completed a systematic analysis of attempted genocide. 
Furthermore, the general category of attempt appears to be the forgotten mode of 
liability in international criminal law. Scholars tend to address the question only 
with regard to the more general relationship between attempt and other modes of 
liability and other inchoate crimes, such as complicity, aiding and abetting, con-
spiracy, and incitement—all of which are analysed in other chapters of this volume. 
 e present chapter focuses exclusively on attempted genocide by analyzing the 
attempt provision in the Genocide Convention, its text and negotiating history, the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), attempts under general princi-
ples of criminal law, and attempts in the case law of the ICTY and ICTR.
2. Attempt to Commit Genocide in the Genocide Convention
Article III(d) of the Genocide Convention explicitly penalizes attempt to commit 
genocide, a provision that—as I have noted above—was directly replicated in 
the ICTY and ICTR Statutes.  e earlier drafts of the Convention all provided 
slightly diﬀ erent renderings of the concept.  e Secretariat Draft contained a 
provision on punishable oﬀ ences that deemed ‘any attempt to commit genocide’ 
as one of the ‘crimes of genocide’.¹³  is provision of the Secretariat Draft placed 
attempt to commit genocide along with its other expansive list of preparatory 
genocide crimes, including:
studies and research for the purpose of developing the technique of genocide; setting up 
installations, manufacturing, obtaining, possessing, or supplying of articles or  substances 
¹¹ See Mettraux, supra note 9, at 257.
¹² Ibid., where Mettraux concludes that such a charge is highly unlikely and if used would be a 
prosecutorial ‘safety net’ along with other genocidal categories.
¹³ Secretariat Draft of the Genocide Convention, Art. II(I)(1).
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with the knowledge that they are intended for genocide; [and] issuing instructions or 
orders, and distributing tasks with a view to committing genocide.’¹⁴
 e qualifying phrase ‘any attempt’, when read in conjunction with the incredibly 
broad subsequent provision on preparatory acts, suggests that the negotiators of 
the Secretariat Draft intended a similarly broad reading of the attempt provision, 
perhaps even broader than the standard deﬁ nition of attempt as ‘an act carried 
out with intent to commit a certain crime which is more than merely preparatory 
to the commission of that crime but which has not been fully successful.’¹⁵  e 
ad hoc Committee Draft included a slightly more streamlined provision which 
included ‘attempt to commit genocide’ among acts that ‘shall be punishable’.¹⁶
Attempt to commit genocide also ﬁ gured in the negotiations regarding incite-
ment to commit genocide.  e US oﬀ ered, unsuccessfully, an amendment that 
would have excluded the crime of incitement to commit genocide from the 
Convention, due to concerns that the provision might be used to undermine free-
dom of expression.¹⁷  e US also pointed out that an incitement provision was 
redundant because such conduct could be prosecuted as conspiracy to commit 
genocide and attempt to commit genocide.¹⁸
 e Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind included 
an attempt provision in Article 2 stating that ‘[a]ttempts to commit such a crime 
by taking action commencing the execution of a crime which does not in fact 
occur because of circumstances independent of his intentions’.¹⁹  is provision 
appears to depart from the attempt provision of the Genocide Convention which 
makes no explicit reference to the appropriate standard from which to judge the 
frustration element of attempt.²⁰ On the other hand, it is unclear what is added 
to the provision by stating that the frustration must stem from ‘circumstances 
independent of his intentions’. If the circumstances were tied to the intentions 
of the defendant, then the crimes would be evaluated as a case of abandonment, 
for which no crime of attempt should attach.²¹ It is also unclear on the basis of 
¹⁴ Ibid., Art. II(I)(2).
¹⁵ Mettraux, supra note 9, at 257 (quoting Article 25(3)(f) of the ICC Statute).
¹⁶ Ad hoc Committee Draft of the Genocide Convention, art. IV(d).
¹⁷ See Schabas, supra note 6, at 267; UN Doc. E/623. See also W.K. Timmermann, ‘Incitement 
in international criminal law’, 88 Int’ l Review of the Red Cross (2006) 823, at 835.
¹⁸ J.F. Metzl, ‘Rwandan Genocide and the International Law of Radio Jamming’, 91 American 
Journal of Int’ l Law (1997) 628, at 637–8.
¹⁹ Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the International 
Law Commission on Its Forty-eighth Session, UN GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 9, UN Doc. 
A/51/10 (1996).
²⁰ R. Rayfuse, ‘ e Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind: Eating 
Disorders at the International Law Commission’, 8 Criminal Law Forum (1997) 43, at 63 (‘this 
appears to impose a higher threshold than that set out in the Genocide Convention and could 
cause considerable diﬃ  culty in the prosecution of these crimes in states not party to the Genocide 
Convention’).
²¹ See K. Ambos, ‘Article 25 Individual Criminal Responsibility’, in O. Triﬀ terer (ed.), 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd edn., Oxford, UK & 
Munich, Germany: Hart Publishing & Verlag C.H. Beck, 2008) 743, at 764. Ambos discusses a 
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the Draft Code of crimes whether the crime ‘which does not in fact occur’ refers 
to the underlying oﬀ ence outlined in Article 17 (e.g. killing members of a group, 
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, etc.) or whether 
it refers to the collective genocide itself.²²
3. Attempts under National Criminal Law
A comparative survey of criminal law systems suggests that there are three general 
requirements for attempt and one defence.  e elements are the intent to commit 
the crime (mens rea), an objective requirement (actus reus), and incompleteness of 
the crime.  e defence is abandonment. Each will be considered here.
3.1  Intention
 e required mental element for attempt does not diﬀ er from the required men-
tal element for a completed oﬀ ence.²³ For example, the US Model Penal Code 
states that a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if he, inter alia, acts 
‘with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime.’²⁴ 
 is suggests that crimes of negligence might be covered by an attempt provision, 
except the Code also reads that the defendant must either ‘purposely engage[] in 
conduct that would constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he 
believes them to be,’²⁵ ‘does or omits to do anything with the purpose of causing or 
with the belief that it will cause such result without further conduct on his part,’²⁶ 
or ‘purposely does or omits to do anything that, under the circumstances as he 
believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course 
of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.’²⁷ In keeping 
with the common law rule, this raises the culpability requirement for attempts 
by requiring purposeful action for oﬀ ences that do not require purposeful action 
when the oﬀ ence is completed.²⁸  e practical eﬀ ect is to avoid penalizing mere 
innocent conduct.²⁹  e relevant baseline is the required mental element for the 
penal statute in question, which remains the same for attempted crimes.
In the case of the ICC Statute, the required mental state is ‘intent and know-
ledge,’ where intent is deﬁ ned as ‘that person means to engage in the conduct’ or 
similar issue with regard to Article 25(3)(f) of the Rome Statute and notes that it is consistent with 
French law which ‘conceives of abandonment as a negative element of the attempt deﬁ nition’. Ibid.
²² Cf. Rayfuse, supra note 20, at 51.
²³ Cf. Robinson, supra note 4, at 632–3 (discussing elevated culpability requirements in the 
common law). See also G.P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, (2nd edn., New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000) 180.
²⁴ See Model Penal Code, § 5.01(1).   ²⁵ Ibid., § 5.01(1)(a).
²⁶ Ibid., § 5.01(1)(b).   ²⁷ Ibid., § 5.01(1)(c).
²⁸ See Robinson, supra note 4, at 632.   ²⁹ Ibid., at 631.
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‘that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the 
ordinary course of events.’³⁰  e ICC Statute also deﬁ nes knowledge as ‘aware-
ness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course 
of events’.³¹ Some commentators have seized upon this language to conclude that 
the Rome Statute covers dolus eventualis and therefore this lower mental require-
ment is also suﬃ  cient for attempts.³²  is strongly suggests that the ICC Statute 
rejects the approach of the common law and the US Model Penal Code in favour 
of the more prosecution-friendly rule of German law.³³
3.2 Act Requirement
 e required act is generally that the perpetrator must, at the very least, take a 
‘substantial step’ toward execution of the crime.  e requirement of a substantial 
step can also be found in the US Model Penal Code.³⁴  e pattern is replicated in 
the ICC Statute, which requires that the perpetrator take ‘action that commences 
its execution by means of a substantial step.’³⁵  e question, of course, is where 
to draw the line on the spectrum covering mere preparatory acts on one end and 
the completed oﬀ ence on the other. An attempt involves more than just plan-
ning, but where exactly it is located on the spectrum is the subject of some schol-
arly dispute. For example, German penal law requires a direct movement toward 
the accomplishment of the crime.³⁶  e US Model Penal Code helpfully oﬀ ers 
seven illustrations, including lying in wait, enticing the victim to the place of the 
crime, ‘reconnoitering’ the place of the crime, unlawful entry to the place of the 
crime, possession of necessary materials for the crime’s execution, and ‘soliciting 
an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element of the crime’.³⁷ 
 e ICC Statute oﬀ ers no similar guidance.
Criminal law theorists have long fretted over the status of so-called impossible 
attempts.³⁸ If a crime could not have been completed, is the perpetrator’s sub-
stantial step still suﬃ  cient to generate liability for attempt? Often, the impossi-
bility stems from the perpetrator’s mistake of fact about an important element of 
the oﬀ ence, such as shooting at an inanimate object in the mistaken belief that 
the object is the perpetrator’s intended victim.³⁹  e outcome of the jurispru-
dential paradox turns on whether one accepts an objective or subjective theory of 
attempts. Under the former theory, the elements of the action include the object-
ive facts on the ground, i.e. that it was an inanimate object that was being ﬁ red 
at, which is no crime. Under the latter theory, what matters is the perpetrator’s 
³⁰ See ICC Statute, Art. 30(2).   ³¹ See ICC Statute, Art. 30(3).
³² See Eser, supra note 7, at 811.   ³³ Ibid.
³⁴ See Model Penal Code, § 5.01(1)(c).   ³⁵ See ICC Statute, Art. 25(3)(f).
³⁶ See StGB § 22; Eser, supra note 7, at 812.   ³⁷ See Model Penal Code, § 5.01(2).
³⁸ For a discussion of the history of impossible attempts, see Fletcher, supra note 23, at 146–57. 
See also Eser, supra note 7, at 813.
³⁹ Fletcher divides the case law into three groups: the shooting cases, the poisoning cases, and 
the empty receptacle cases. See Fletcher, supra note 23, at 149, 152, 154.
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subjective state of mind, i.e. that he believed that he was ﬁ ring at a human being, 
which is a crime. One distinguished author suggests that the objective theory can 
still generate liability for an impossible attempt if the act is a ‘manifestly apt eﬀ ort 
to commit a proscribed oﬀ ense.’⁴⁰
3.3 Incompleteness
An attempt, by deﬁ nition, must be incomplete. Obviously, if the oﬀ ence is com-
pleted, the attempt is transformed into a completed oﬀ ence.  is criterion helps 
explain why attempt provisions ‘merge’ with a completed oﬀ ence.  is is to be 
contrasted with conspiracy which in some jurisdictions does not merge with the 
completed oﬀ ence, thus allowing prosecutors to charge a defendant with both 
conspiracy to commit murder and murder simpliciter. Merger is impossible 
because an attempted oﬀ ence and a completed oﬀ ence are mutually exclusive 
possibilities by virtue of the incompleteness requirement. Otherwise, every com-
pleted oﬀ ence could be characterized as encompassing a shadow attempt, which 
reduces the notion of attempt to an absurdity.
In cases of genocide, the operative question is whether the incompleteness 
refers to the underlying oﬀ ence or to the genocide itself. Two paradigms are pos-
sible with regard to the incompleteness criterion. In considering the case of an 
intentional killing constituting genocide, the incompleteness might stem from 
the fact that the individual in question was not killed, though the genocide was 
completed in another manner (and perhaps by other perpetrators). Under the 
second paradigm, the victim is killed (with genocidal intent), though the over-
all genocide against the group never materializes, and no other individuals (or 
perhaps not a signiﬁ cant number) are killed. A third paradigm might also be 
possible, where the intentional killing of the single victim is incomplete because 
he or she survives and the overall genocidal plan is frustrated as well and no other 
victims are killed. Which is the relevant incompleteness where attempted geno-
cide is concerned? At least with regard to the second paradigm it can be argued 
that this satisﬁ es the deﬁ nition for genocide as a completed oﬀ ence, since the 
ICC, ICTR and ICTY Statutes only require ‘killing members of the group’ with 
intent to destroy ‘in whole or in part’ a protected group.⁴¹ Consequently, an iso-
lated killing committed with genocidal intent would appear to meet the statutory 
deﬁ nition of completed genocide, even though it may depart from the historical, 
non-legal understanding of the concept as involving the widespread killing of an 
ethnic group as opposed to a hate crime directed against an individual motivated 
by genocidal hatred.⁴²
⁴⁰ See Fletcher, supra note 23, at 152.
⁴¹ See, e.g., ICC Statute, Art. 6.  e language stems directly from Article II of the Genocide 
Convention.
⁴² Cf. A. Cassese, ‘Jurisdiction ratione materiae—Genocide’, in Cassese, Gaeta, and Jones 
(eds), supra note 7, Vol. I, 335, at 347–48 (concluding that genocide may involve the killing of a 
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3.4 Abandonment
Most jurisdictions allow a perpetrator to escape criminal liability if they abandon 
the attempt.  e defence originally stemmed from an inference from the basic 
standard for an attempt: i.e. that liability attached for an attempted oﬀ ence if the 
crime was interrupted as a result of factors beyond the perpetrator’s control.⁴³ By 
inference, then, an interruption that stems from within the actor’s control, such 
as a decision to reverse course and abandon the eﬀ ort, was seen as suﬃ  cient to 
escape liability under this standard.⁴⁴ While a change of course (or expression of 
regret) might be insuﬃ  cient to nullify culpability for a completed oﬀ ence, some-
thing in the nature of attempted oﬀ ences makes the change of course legally and 
morally signiﬁ cant for matters of culpability.⁴⁵ On one theory the defence gives 
an incentive to perpetrators to abandon their criminal eﬀ orts; on a second theory, 
abandonment makes the perpetrator less dangerous to society; a third theory sug-
gests that the perpetrator lacks the necessary intent to follow through with his or 
her plan (by virtue of voluntarily abandoning it).⁴⁶ Of course, setting the correct 
standard for determining a voluntary abandonment is controversial, especially in 
cases where the victim dissuades the perpetrator from completing the oﬀ ence or 
when the expected gains from the criminal venture suddenly diminish.⁴⁷
4. Attempt to Commit Genocide under the ICC Statute
 e ICC Statute’s drafters did not follow the Genocide Convention in including 
attempt in its Article 6 genocide provision, preferring instead to codify a general 
attempt provision applicable to all crimes within the court’s jurisdiction:
Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means 
of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances  independent 
small number of individuals). Cassese appears to believe that, in theory, genocide might be legally 
accomplished by the killing of two individuals, since the predicate acts referred to in Article 6 of 
the ICC Statute are all plural (e.g. killings members of the group), and anything more than one vic-
tim would appear to meet the grammatical requirements of the plural form of the noun. Compare 
with G.P. Fletcher and J.D. Ohlin, ‘Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the 
Darfur Case’, 3 Journal of Int’ l Criminal Justice (2005) 539, at 545–8 (genocide as a collective 
endeavor). See also A. Zahar and G. Sluiter, International Criminal Law: A Critical Introduction 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 174 (noting that ‘it will be very diﬃ  cult to prove the 
genocidal intent of an individual if the crimes committed were not widespread and were not backed 
by an organization or a system’).
⁴³ See Robinson, supra note 4, at 624. For a discussion, see Fletcher, supra note 23, at 184–97.
⁴⁴ See Fletcher, supra note 23, at 185 (citing French Penal Code of 1810).
⁴⁵ Eser, supra note 7, at 815 (discussing forms of abandonment).
⁴⁶ See Fletcher, supra note 23, at 186–8.
⁴⁷ See Fletcher, supra note 23, at 191 (noting that under German law a thief is guilty of attempt 
if he or she ‘desists because the bounty is not large enough’).
09-Gaeta-Ch09.indd   180 5/28/2009   6:08:36 PM
Attempt to Commit Genocide 181
of the person’s intentions. However, a person who abandons the eﬀ ort to commit the 
crime or otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for punish-
ment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that person completely 
and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.⁴⁸
 e second sentence is somewhat redundant since the ﬁ rst sentence already sug-
gests abandonment⁴⁹  e crucial criterion of ‘circumstances independent of the 
person’s intentions’ perfectly tracks the attempt provisions that have long existed 
in domestic criminal law, such as the French Penal Code’s provision of 1810 of 
‘circumstances independent of the actor’s will’.⁵⁰ However, the provision requires 
more than just voluntary abandonment of the criminal purpose—the perpetra-
tor must also ‘completely’ abandon the criminal purpose as well.  e provision is 
somewhat diﬀ erent from its precursor in the 1996 Draft Code, which penalized 
‘attempts to commit such a crime by taking action commencing the execution 
of a crime which does not in fact occur because of circumstances independent of 
his intentions,’ though it made no explicit mention of abandonment.⁵¹  e 1991 
Draft Code included attempt liability for crimes that were ‘failed’ or ‘halted’ due 
to ‘circumstances independent of the perpetrator’s intention’ and likewise did not 
explicitly mention abandonment.⁵²  e 1954 Draft Code did not include attempt 
in its genocide provision,⁵³ though it did include a general attempt provision.⁵⁴
It is worthwhile scrutinizing the International Law Commission (ILC) nego-
tiating process that produced the Draft Codes in order to resolve the question of 
whether attempted genocide was meant to cover an incomplete underlying oﬀ ence 
or an incomplete genocide.  e Commentary to the 1954 Draft Code noted that 
its general attempt provision was necessary because attempt was included in the 
Genocide Convention.⁵⁵  e Commentary to the 1996 Draft Code noted that 
attempt should be punished because ‘a high degree of culpability attaches to an 
individual who attempts to commit a crime and is unsuccessful only because 
of circumstances beyond his control rather than his own decision to abandon 
⁴⁸ ICC Statute, Art. 25(3)(f).
⁴⁹ See Ambos, supra note 21, at 764 (noting that the second sentence was added based on a pro-
posal from the Japanese delegation and supported by Germany, Argentina and others). Ambos con-
cludes that ‘[i]n the heat of the negotiations, the drafters, including this author, overlooked the fact 
that the ﬁ rst clause already contained a rule on abandonment, albeit only an implicit one.’ Ibid.
⁵⁰ See Fletcher, supra note 23, at 185. Similar language is found in the German penal codes of 
1871 and 1975.
⁵¹ See 1996 Draft Code, supra note 19, Art. 2(3)(g).
⁵² See Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the 
International Law Commission on the work of its forty-third session, UN GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. 
No. 10, at 94, UN Doc. A/46/10 (1991), Art. 3(3).
⁵³ See Draft Code of Oﬀ enses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the 
International Law Commission on Its Sixth Session, 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 11, UN Doc. 
A/2693 (1954), Art. 2(9).
⁵⁴ Ibid., Art. 2(12)(iii).
⁵⁵ See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission (1951), Vol. II, at p. 137.
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the criminal endeavor.’⁵⁶ In addition to speciﬁ cally noting that attempt was cov-
ered by the Genocide Convention as well as by the 1954 Draft Code of Crimes, 
the ILC also argued that ‘the fact that an individual has taken a signiﬁ cant step 
towards the completion of one of the crimes set out in Articles 17 to 20 entails 
a threat to international peace and security because of the very serious nature of 
these crimes.’⁵⁷ ( e 1994 Draft Statute and its commentary include no discus-
sion of attempt whatsoever.) Although certainly the same rationale applies to the 
ICC Statute’s scheme to criminalize only the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community (crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, 
and aggression), as well as the Genocide Convention, the same cannot be said of 
domestic penal systems which also penalize attempt even in cases of crimes that 
are minor (and not of concern to the international community).
It is also true that attempts ought to be punished because perpetrators of 
attempts share the same culpability as perpetrators of completed oﬀ ences.  e 
same is true with regard to the more speciﬁ c case of genocide. However, this 
view is not universally shared.  e rapporteur at the 1942 London International 
Assembly argued that the category of war crimes should not include attempts, 
regardless of the reason for the incompleteness of the oﬀ ence,⁵⁸ and the 1968 
Convention on Statutory Limitations also excluded liability for attempts.⁵⁹ 
 e current ICC Statute has deﬁ nitively resolved at least this aspect of the 
disagreement.
5. Attempt in ICTY and ICTR Case Law
Because there have been no prosecutions for attempt to commit genocide, either 
before the ICTY or ICTR, or anywhere else, recourse must be had to how the tri-
bunals have treated attempts in their case law with regard to other international 
crimes. However, attempt to commit genocide is the only attempt oﬀ ence in the 
ICTY and ICTR Statutes (unlike the ICC Statute where attempt is covered by a 
general provision).  e ICTY and the ICTR Statutes call out genocide for spe-
cial treatment by listing speciﬁ c modes of liability, including attempt, unlike the 
other crimes which must refer to Article 7 and Article 6 respectively to deter-
mine the covered modes of liability.  e unfortunate overlap between the general 
modes of liability in Article 7 and Article 6 and the genocide-speciﬁ c modes of 
liability listed in Article 4(3) and Article 2(3) was caused by the fact that Articles 
4 and 2 were lifted—modes of liability and all—from Article III of the Genocide 
Convention without apparent concern for the overlap it created with Articles 7 
⁵⁶ See 1996 Draft Code, supra note 19, at 22.   ⁵⁷ Ibid.
⁵⁸ See M. De Baer, London International Assembly, Commission for the Trial of War Crimes, 
‘Scope and Meaning of the Conception of War Crimes,’ quoted in Mettraux, supra note 9, at 294, 
note 84.
⁵⁹ See Mettraux, supra note 9, at 294.
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and Article 6.  is problem was identiﬁ ed by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Kristić 
when it noted that Article 4(3) was not just taken in substance from Article III of 
the Genocide Convention, but taken verbatim.⁶⁰
Prosecutions for attempt for other international crimes are also extremely 
rare. One possible explanation is that attempted war crimes or crimes against 
humanity might never be signiﬁ cant enough to meet the ‘seriousness threshold of 
Article 1 of the statutes and therefore come within the Tribunals’ jurisdiction.’⁶¹ 
 is might be one reason why some international statutes have ignored attempt 
liability.⁶² On this view, the drafters of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes clearly did 
not intend to cover attempted crimes against humanity and war crimes because 
such attempts would not have implicated the collective considerations of peace 
and security that animated the creation of the tribunals in the ﬁ rst instance. 
Under this view, however, genocide is diﬀ erent, because even an attempted geno-
cide implicates the twin aims of the Security Council’s Chapter VII authority.
Also, the analysis depends entirely on whether attempt refers to the overall 
international crime or the underlying criminal act. If it is the former, the serious-
ness of the situation for international peace and security—and the accompanying 
Article 1 threshold—may indeed be called into doubt (although not necessarily 
so), but if it is the latter, it is still easy to imagine that an attempted underlying 
criminal act may be part of an overall criminal endeavor that is suﬃ  ciently con-
sequential so as to be, in the words of the ICC Statute preamble, of the ‘gravest 
concern to the international community’.
Nonetheless, in Vasiljević, the ICTY Trial Chamber found that the defendant 
‘incurred individual criminal responsibility for the attempted murder of these 
two Muslim men as inhumane acts pursuant to his participation in a joint crim-
inal enterprise to murder them.’⁶³  e victims had survived after being shot. 
According to the Trial Chamber, the incomplete oﬀ ence constituted a serious 
attack on their human dignity, and thus constituted a crime against human-
ity.  is particular theoretical move was not critically analysed by the Appeals 
Chamber.⁶⁴
 e Akayesu case dealt more directly with attempted genocide.  e ICTR Trial 
Chamber noted that Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute only penalized those who 
‘planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the 
planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the 
present Statute.’⁶⁵ Although this covers a wide range of preparatory acts ‘ran-
ging from its initial planning to its execution, through its organization,’ the Trial 
⁶⁰ Judgment, Kristić, Trial Chamber, 2 August 2001, § 640.
⁶¹ See Mettraux, supra note 9, at 293.
⁶² For example, Control Council Law No. 10 did not include attempts, at least not explicitly, 
though it allowed courts to draw general conclusions from national penal law (most of which pen-
alize attempts).
⁶³ ICTY, Judgment, Vasiljević, Trial Chamber, 29 November 2002, § 239.
⁶⁴ Ibid.
⁶⁵ ICTR, Judgment, Akayesu, Trial Chamber, 2 September 1998, § 546.
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Chamber concluded that this wide liability nonetheless contemplated the exist-
ence of a completed oﬀ ence, i.e. that ‘the planning or preparation of the crime 
actually leads to its commission.’⁶⁶  e one exception to this rule is attempt to 
commit genocide, which by deﬁ nition is inchoate, and the Trial Chamber noted 
that individual criminal responsibility for attempts was limited by the ICTR 
Statute to genocide.⁶⁷ In addition to appealing to Nuremberg (which the court 
argued stood for the proposition that liability for ordering the commission of a 
crime required a completed oﬀ ence),⁶⁸ the Trial Chamber also noted that Article 
2(3) of the Draft Code of Crimes penalized most modes of liability for a crime 
‘which in fact occurs’.⁶⁹  e subsection on attempts stands out for its language 
that liability attaches for a ‘crime which does not in fact occur’.⁷⁰
 e ICTR Trial Chamber also concluded in Akayesu that complicity in geno-
cide requires an actual genocide because ‘complicity can only exist when there is a 
punishable, principal act, in the commission of which the accomplice has associ-
ated himself.’⁷¹  is argument was based on the legislative history of the Genocide 
Convention.  e Chamber concluded that ‘[i]t appears from the travaux prépara-
toires of the Genocide Convention that only complicity in the completed oﬀ ence 
of genocide was intended for punishment and not complicity in an attempt to 
commit genocide, complicity in incitement to commit genocide nor complicity 
in conspiracy to commit genocide, all of which were, in the eyes of some states, 
too vague to be punishable under the Convention.’⁷²  e Trial Chamber reiter-
ated the same position in Musema (in virtually identical language).⁷³  e position 
was left undisturbed by the Appeals Chamber.
6. Concluding Remarks
Many of these doctrinal controversies are unlikely to be resolved any time soon. 
Of course, any truly complete international penal statute must out of neces-
sity include an attempt provision, but this is no guarantee that prosecutors will 
charge it and judges will apply it. However, future hybrid courts, specialized 
tribunals, and national criminal courts applying international law may indeed 
make more use of the attempt category.  e ICC is unlikely to develop this 
area of the international doctrine since it concentrates its eﬀ orts on the highest 
level oﬀ enders whose conduct threatens regional peace and security and whose 
alleged violations are unlikely to be described as attempts. But specialized and 
⁶⁶ Ibid., § 473.   ⁶⁷ Ibid., §§ 473 and note 80.   ⁶⁸ Ibid., § 474.
⁶⁹ Ibid., § 475; 1996 Draft Code, supra note 19, at Art. 2(3).
⁷⁰ 1996 Draft Code, supra note 19, at Art. 2(3)(g).
⁷¹ Akayesu, supra note 66, § 529. Although the crime of genocide must be completed, it is not 
necessary for the principal perpetrator to be charged as well.
⁷² Akayesu, supra note 66, note 105.
⁷³ Judgment, Musema, Trial Chamber, 27 January 2000, §§ 171–4.
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local courts may indeed prosecute lower rung criminal oﬀ ences where the cat-
egory of attempt may arise more frequently. It is in these locations where the 
exact contours of the crime of attempt to commit genocide are most likely to be 
judicially developed and tested.  e jurists presiding over these courts will there-
fore bear a heavy burden to see that they tread carefully through these uncertain 
jurisprudential waters.
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Incitement and Conspiracy to 
Commit Genocide
Jens David Ohlin
1. Introduction
Incitement and conspiracy to commit genocide are both inchoate oﬀ ences whose 
criminalization at the international level has historically been justiﬁ ed by the 
especially reprehensible nature of genocide as a unique crime of historical pro-
portions.¹ $ is unique nature of genocidal crimes has been evoked to justify 
expansive liability for genocide, even among criminal lawyers who would nor-
mally eschew general conspiracy or incitement liability in their domestic penal 
systems. Although there are great jurisprudential and theoretical questions raised 
by the criminalization of conspiracy to commit genocide and incitement to com-
mit genocide, the bare fact that such actions should yield international crim-
inal liability has generated remarkably little controversy or dispute.² However, 
¹ See Decision on Sentence, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Chamber, 2 October 1998 (‘[T]he 
Chamber is of the opinion that genocide constitutes the crime of crimes’).
² See, e.g., W.A. Schabas, ‘Article 6 Genocide’, in O. Triﬀ terer (ed.) Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd edn., Oxford, UK & Munich, Germany: Hart 
Publishing & Verlag C.H. Beck, 2008) 143, at 155 (‘$ ere was no real debate on this point, and the 
inconsistency with the terms of Genocide Convention would appear to be inadvertent.’).
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 questions regarding conspiracy are among the most contested areas of contem-
porary criminal law theory.³
2. Incitement and Conspiracy
At common law, incitement involved ‘encouraging or pressurising another to 
commit an oﬀ ence.’⁴ A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more indi-
viduals to commit an unlawful act. Both incitement and conspiracy are pre-
paratory oﬀ ences. $ ey are two points on the path toward a completed oﬀ ence, 
and it is precisely for this reason that domestic penal law systems have sought 
to criminalize them.⁵ First, the rationale is that those who engage in the pre-
paratory acts betray a culpable mental state, even if they did not participate in 
the completed oﬀ ence.⁶ Second, criminalizing the preparatory acts allows the 
authorities to intervene in developing criminality before a completed act can be 
consummated.⁷ On this view, restricting criminal liability to completed oﬀ ences 
would needlessly hamstring legal authorities who stumble upon an ongoing 
criminal endeavour whose work is still in the preparatory phases, either by virtue 
of conspiring to commit the oﬀ ence, instigating it, or inciting others to commit 
it. Arguably, it is precisely such early interventions that policy-makers want to 
encourage by penalizing incitement and conspiracy.
However, conspiracy is both a mode of liability and a substantive oﬀ ence in the 
sense that under some domestic penal systems the existence of the criminal agree-
ment allows the government to charge a defendant with the crime of conspiracy 
to commit murder, but the criminal agreement may also be the foundation for 
charging the defendant with murder itself, under the theory that by joining the 
conspiracy, the actions of one member of the conspiracy may be legally attributed 
to each member of the group.⁸ $ e former is conspiracy as a substantive oﬀ ence 
and the latter is conspiracy as a mode of liability.
Conspiracy as a mode of liability does not exist in the relevant international 
instruments dealing with international crimes—at least not under this  doctrinal 
³ See, e.g., J.D. Ohlin, ‘$ ree Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal 
Enterprise’, 5 Journal of Int’ l Criminal Justice (2006) 69; G.P. Fletcher, ‘Amicus Curiae Brief of 
Specialists in Conspiracy and International Law in Support of Petitioner’, 2006 WL 53979 (argu-
ing that conspiracy is not a triable oﬀ ence under the laws of war), ﬁ led in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. 557 (2006).
⁴ R. Geary, Essential Criminal Law (2nd edn., London: Cavendish Publishing Ltd., 1998), 36.
⁵ See P.H. Robinson, Criminal Law (New York: Aspen Publishers, 1997), 645 (‘[C]onspiracy 
has the advantage of commonly allowing earlier intervention than the substantial-step require-
ment of attempt allows’).
⁶ Ibid., at 644–5.   ⁷ Ibid., at 645.
⁸ $ is is vicarious liability, and in the US the doctrine is referred to as ‘Pinkerton’ liability after 
the case of Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). For a discussion, see J.D. Ohlin, ‘Group 
$ ink: $ e Law of Conspiracy and Collective Reason’, Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 
(2007) 147.
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name. However, other modes of liability reach similar collective conduct. For 
example, the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise (JCE) yields criminal liability 
for defendants at the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, which was recog-
nized by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yuguslavia’s (ICTY) 
decision in Tadić.⁹ Under the so-called JCE III, members of a joint criminal 
endeavour may be prosecuted for the actions of other members of the collective 
endeavor, even if those actions fall outside the scope of the criminal plan, as long 
as these actions were reasonably foreseeable.¹⁰ $ is latter aspect of JCE is directly 
analogous to the conspiracy doctrine, known as Pinkerton liability, applied by US 
federal courts.¹¹
Conspiracy as a substantive oﬀ ence has generally been rejected at the inter-
national level.¹² $ e concept was deeply controversial at Nuremberg, with 
representatives from civil law countries (particularly France) at the London 
Conference arguing against the concept’s application at the International 
Military Tribunal (IMT) because the notion was foreign to their legal systems 
and violated basic principles of individual criminal liability by imposing liabil-
ity for collective conduct.¹³ Consequently, the IMT only convicted defendants 
of one conspiracy charge: conspiracy to wage aggressive war on the theory that 
aggression was already, by deﬁ nition, a collective crime such that the doctrine 
of conspiracy did not greatly increase the inculpation faced by the individual 
defendants.¹⁴
Incitement as a codiﬁ ed oﬀ ence was unknown at Nuremberg, although 
Streicher, convicted of publishing genocidal articles in Der Sturmer, was essen-
tially prosecuted for incitement although he was not formally charged with that 
oﬀ ence.¹⁵ But the substance of his trial indicates that this was the underlying 
⁹ Judgment, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, § 195 passim. See also 
A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
189–209.
¹⁰ See Tadić, supra note 9, § 228.
¹¹ See Ohlin, supra note 8, at 149 and note10.
¹² See Fletcher, supra note 3, at 9 (‘European scholars are unanimous on this point.’) and 11.
¹³ See Fletcher, supra note 3, at 15 (noting that French jurist Henri Donnedieu de Vabres ‘made 
the argument virtually every Continental jurist wanted to make against the American and British 
eﬀ ort to include conspiracy within the realm of permissible charges against the Nazi leaders, 
namely that conspiracy is foreign to every legal system outside the English-speaking world’); see 
also B.F. Smith, Reaching Judgment in Nuremberg (1963), 123.
¹⁴ See J.A. Bush, ‘ “$ e Supreme . . . Crime” and its Origins: $ e Lost Legislative History of the 
Crime of Aggressive War’, 102 Columbia Law Review (2002) 2324; J.A. Bush, ‘Nuremberg: $ e 
Modern Law of War and its Limitations’, 93 Columbia Law Review (1999) 2022.
¹⁵ Streicher was convicted of persecution as a crime against humanity under Count Four, but 
acquitted of participation in the common plan or conspiracy under Count One. But it is clear 
from the judgment that the nature of the persecution was incitement. See Judgment, Streicher, 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (‘Streicher’s incitement to murder and extermin-
ation at the time when Jews in the East were being killed under the most horrible conditions clearly 
constitutes persecution on political and racial grounds in connection with war crimes as deﬁ ned by 
the Charter, and constitutes a crime against humanity.’). $ e Tribunal acquitted Hans Fritzsche 
of the Nazi Propaganda Ministry because although he expressed virulent anti-semitic views, his 
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theory of the prosecution.¹⁶ Similarly, Otto Dietrich was convicted at the US 
Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, under Control Council Law No. 10, for 
crimes against humanity.¹⁷ Dietrich worked under Goebbels at the Ministry of 
Public Enlightenment and Propaganda and had eﬀ ective control over its press 
operation.¹⁸ $ e ministry issued press directives that required that news outlets 
emphasize the ‘noxiousness of the Jews’ and the world danger posed by them.¹⁹
3.  e Drafting History
Incitement and conspiracy to commit genocide are both explicitly illegal under 
the Genocide Convention. $ e Secretariat Draft of the Genocide Convention 
explicitly included liability for ‘direct public incitement to any act of genocide 
whether the incitement be successful or not,’²⁰ as well as liability for ‘conspiracy 
to commit acts of genocide.’²¹ However, the Secretariat Draft also included a 
separate provision for the following more speciﬁ c ‘preparatory acts’ that arguably 
created a scheme of overlapping liability:
studies and research for the purpose of developing the technique of genocide; setting up 
of installations, manufacturing, obtaining, possessing or supplying of articles or sub-
stances with the knowledge that they are intended for genocide; issuing instructions or 
orders, and distributing tasks with a view to committing genocide.²²
broadcasts ‘did not urge persecution or extermination of Jews’ nor did they incite the Germans to 
‘commit atrocities on conquered peoples.’ See Judgment, Fritzsche, International Military Tribunal 
at Nuremberg. In fact, the Tribunal noted that Fritzsche attempted to suppress publication of Der 
Sturmer. $ e Fritzsche case is cited by the ICTR Judgment, Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Trial Chamber, 
3 December 2003, § 982.
¹⁶ See D.F. Orentlicher, ‘Criminalizing Hate Speech in the Crucible of Trial: Prosecutor v. 
Nahimana’, 21 American University Int’ l Law Review (2006) 557, at 582–3. $ e Streicher prece-
dent was cited by the ICTR Trial Chamber in Nahimana, supra note 15, § 1073, which described 
the inﬂ uence of Streicher’s articles as ‘a poison that infected the minds of the Germany people 
and conditioned them to follow the lead of the National Socialists in persecuting the Jewish peo-
ple’. $ e ICTR Trial Chamber concluded that ‘in Rwanda, the virulent writings of Kangura and 
the incendiary broadcasts of RTLM functioned in the same way, conditioning the Hutu popu-
lation and creating a climate of harm, as evidenced in part by the extermination and genocide 
that followed’. See Orentlicher, above, at 583–4 (describing the ICTR Trial Chamber’s reading 
of Streicher as misleading because, inter alia, Streicher was only convicted for articles published 
during the Holocaust, not for his articles that stretched back for 25 years, and these articles were 
closely linked to the extermination of Jews during World War II and Streicher ‘continued to write 
and publish his propaganda of death’ knowing full well that Jews were being exterminated). See 
also H.R. Davidson, ‘$ e International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Decision in Prosecutor 
v. Ferdinand Nahimana et al.: $ e Past, Present, and Future of International Incitement Law’, 17 
Leiden Journal of Int’ l Law (2004) 505; C.A. MacKinnon, ‘International Decision: Prosecutor v. 
Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze’, 98 American Journal of Int’ l Law (2004) 325, at 328.
¹⁷ See W.K. Timmermann, ‘Incitement in International Criminal Law’, 88 Int’ l Review of the 
Red Cross (2006) 823, at 831–2.
¹⁸ Ministries Case, 14 Trials of War Criminals 314, at 565–76.
¹⁹ Ibid. ²⁰ Secretariat Draft, Art. II(II(2).
²¹ Secretariat Draft, Art. II(II)(3).   ²² Secretariat Draft, Arts. I(I)(2)(a), (b), (c).
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Obviously, liability for ‘studying and research’ is almost unparalleled in other 
areas of the criminal law, but drafters of the Secretariat Draft were motivated 
by a desire to stop genocidal programs before they were consummated.²³ $ e 
provision was not without its critics who viewed the provision as infringing free-
dom of expression.²⁴ Similarly, criminalizing the setting up of installations or the 
possession of articles or substances that are otherwise legal, but that may be used 
for genocide, represents a truly expansive view of liability for preparatory acts to 
genocide. Presumably, the distinction between mere innocent possession of some 
article and an illegal preparatory act under Article II(2) of the draft convention 
was to be determined by genocidal intent. However, the expansive liability for 
‘setting up of installations, manufacturing, obtaining, possessing or supplying 
of articles or substances’ was provided not just in cases where the individual in 
question intends to use them for genocidal purposes, but also where the indi-
vidual has knowledge that they are intended for genocide; this suggests that by 
its terms, liability under the provision would have attached even if an individual 
only had knowledge that someone else planned to use the installations for genocide. 
$ is early-intervention strategy of the Secretariat draft is also evidenced by the 
explicit mention that ‘direct public incitement’ is a crime regardless of whether 
the incitement is successful or not.²⁵ $ ere can be no question where the framers 
of the Secretariat draft stood on the question of preparatory and conspiratorial 
liability.
$ e ad hoc Committee Draft retained the language that incitement was crim-
inal ‘whether such incitement be successful or not’, but the entire section on 
illegal preparatory acts was excised from the working draft.²⁶ $ e draft includes 
no separate liability for creating installations, possessing materials to be used for 
genocide, or issuing instructions, though at least the latter category was presum-
ably covered by the draft’s remaining provisions on conspiracy to commit geno-
cide and ‘complicity in any of the acts enumerated’ in Article IV of the draft. 
Indeed, depending on how narrow or wide one reads conspiracy and compli-
city in genocide (particularly the latter), potentially all of the excluded prepara-
tory acts might remain criminal. However, by the time the ﬁ nal draft of the 
Convention was adopted, even the language establishing liability for incitement 
in the absence of a completed genocide was excluded from Article III—an exclu-
sion which has prompted a long-term scholarly and judicial dispute over the exact 
scope of incitement as a crime under international criminal law.²⁷
$ e question of conspiracy generally was a controversial one during the nego-
tiating process. Although conspiracy as such was unknown in civil law,²⁸ civil 
²³ See W.A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), at 266–7, citing Secretariat Commentary, UN Doc. E/447, at 30–11.
²⁴ Ibid., at 267. ²⁵ Secretariat Draft, Art. II(II)(2).
²⁶ Ad hoc Committee Draft, Art. IV.   ²⁷ See infra § 4.1.
²⁸ Civil law jurisdictions use similar concepts that cover the same functional ground. See G.P. 
Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (2nd edn., New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 647 
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law nations were willing to accept its inclusion in the Convention, although there 
was some diﬃ  culty in translating the concept of conspiracy into languages such 
as French that include corresponding legal terms (e.g. complot or entente) that are 
similar but not an exact match.²⁹ $ is stands in marked contrast to the schol-
arly and judicial controversy surrounding conspiracy at Nuremberg, and the 
International Military Tribunal for the Major War Criminals’ (IMT) near-uni-
versal rejection of the legal concept (except for the now-inert crime of aggression 
which has never been prosecuted by an international court since Nuremberg and 
still awaits a deﬁ nition from the state parties to the ICC Statute).³⁰ $ ere is lit-
tle direct evidence to explain the diﬀ erent attitude about the concept. Why were 
French jurists so bothered by the common law concept at Nuremberg, claiming 
that its very foundation was anathema to civil law systems, yet when the Genocide 
Convention was adopted in 1948 just a few years later, the idea of criminalizing 
conspiracy to commit genocide was not vigorously contested, even among French 
international lawyers involved in the drafting process (though the issue was dis-
cussed)? True, genocide was not explicitly charged at Nuremberg, although it 
is clear that genocidal acts were covered as a subcategory of the more general 
‘crimes against humanity’. Indeed, it would appear that the exception allowed by 
the civil law judges at Nuremberg for conspiracy to commit aggression has been 
transferred now to conspiracy to commit genocide. Is the rationale for the latter 
the same as the former? It is at least plausible to argue that genocide is inherently 
collective in the same way as aggression is collective (genocide cannot be com-
mitted without a widespread governmental policy or social practice).³¹
(‘this single crime ﬁ lls a number of diverse functions that are satisﬁ ed by other doctrinal devices in 
Continental legal systems’).
²⁹ See Schabas, supra note 23, at 260–1.
³⁰ See Fletcher, supra note 3, at 16 (noting that both Francis Biddle and his aide Herbert Wechsler 
were sympathetic to the French critique regarding conspiracy). Prof. Wechsler would later become 
the chief drafter of the US Model Penal Code. See also Smith, supra note 14, at 126. Fletcher refers 
to the decision to convict for conspiracy for aggression but not for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity as a ‘compromise’ verdict. Furthermore, the conspiracy charge was also rejected in every 
case argued by prosecutor Telford Taylor before the subsequent US Military Tribunals sitting at 
Nuremberg. See Fletcher, supra note 3, at 17.
³¹ See, e.g., Judgment, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, § 191 (referring 
to ‘manifestations of collective criminality’). See also J.D. Ohlin and G.P. Fletcher, ‘Reclaiming 
Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case’, 3 Journal of Int’ l Criminal Justice 
(2005) 539, at 545–8. $ e requirement that the genocidal acts must be committed as ‘part of 
a wider plan to destroy the group as such’ originates with Judgment, Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Trial 
Chamber, 14 December 1999, §§ 66, 79. $ e Appeals Chamber rejected this view that a wider 
plan or policy was a necessary ingredient, though it conceded that ‘in the context of proving spe-
ciﬁ c intent, the existence of a plan or policy may become an important factor in most cases.’ See 
Judgment, Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Appeals Chamber, 5 July 2001, § 48. For a critical discussion of 
the Trial Chamber’s theory, see A. Zahar and G. Sluiter, International Criminal Law: A Critical 
Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 173–5. See also Cassese, supra note 9, at 
140 (rejecting the views of both the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber in Jelisić). Cassese 
concludes that some underlying crimes of genocide ‘not only presuppose, but necessarily take the 
shape of, some sort of collective or even organized action’ (e.g. preventing births within a group, 
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However, the more likely answer is somewhat less conceptual: conspiracy was 
allowed as a crime under the Genocide Convention simply because the whole 
point of the Convention was to deter genocide from happening again and the 
drafters were particularly concerned with creating suﬃ  cient inculpation for 
domestic authorities to intervene in developing genocidal programs. In this sense, 
the retention of conspiracy in the ﬁ nal draft of the Genocide Convention repre-
sents a compromise approach balanced by the removal of the Secretariat draft’s 
expansive provisions on preparatory acts. Genocide was horrendous enough that 
conspiracy to commit it was suﬃ  ciently disruptive to the international system, 
but penalizing mere preparatory acts such as the building of installations that 
might also be used to for other purposes was simply going too far.
4. ICTY and ICTR Statutes and Case Law
$ e incitement and conspiracy provisions of the Genocide Convention were 
carried over directly into the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, although the other 
international crimes under the jurisdiction of the two ad hoc Tribunals do not 
encompass liability for conspiracy and incitement.³² Such diﬀ erential treatment 
is usually explained as being necessitated by the horrendous nature of genocidal 
crimes such that the international community is justiﬁ ed in penalizing mere pre-
paratory acts, even those such as incitement that are merely verbal acts at the 
opposite end of the spectrum from the completed oﬀ ence.³³ Apparently, the 
Security Council believed that the appropriate standard for genocidal liability 
was contained in the Convention and copied the provisions virtually verbatim 
when it drafted the ICTY and ICTR Statutes.
4.1 Incitement to Commit Genocide
Incitement must be distinguished from instigation, which is listed as a mode of 
liability under Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute and Article 6(1) of the ICTR 
Statute. $ e practical eﬀ ect of this distinction is that for instigation, the prosecu-
tion must demonstrate that the defendant’s instigation ‘substantially contributed’ 
to the commission of the genocide.³⁴ In contrast, a conviction for incitement as a 
forcibly transferring children, etc.) but that other underlying crimes (e.g. individual rape, killing, 
or torture) do not. Ibid. at 141.
³² See ICTY Statute, Arts. 4(3)(b) and 4(3)(c); ICTR Statute, Arts. 2(3)(b) and 2(3)(c).
³³ See, e.g., Cassese, supra note 9, at 229 (‘Genocide is held to be such a heinous crime involving 
annihilation of entire human groups, that any act or conduct leading to, or pushing towards, its 
perpetration is banned and criminalized’); Schabas, supra note 23, 257 (‘$ e seriousness of geno-
cide and its dire consequences for humanity compel the application of the law before the crime 
actually takes place.’).
³⁴ Judgment, Nahimana, 12 January 2007, Appeals Chamber, § 678.
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substantive oﬀ ence may be obtained even if the incitement did not ‘substantially 
contribute’ to the commission of genocide.³⁵
Unfortunately, the ICTY and ICTR Statutes make no mention of whether 
incitement could be penalized in cases without a completed genocide, an absence 
that can be traced back explicitly to the removal of this provision when the ﬁ nal 
text of the Genocide Convention was prepared (which in turn was transferred 
over to the ICTY and ICTR Statutes). Presumably, the absence is explained less 
by a desire of the Security Council to remove liability for incitement for uncon-
summated genocide, but rather the existence of the Rwandan and Yugoslavian 
genocides made such questions moot: since the genocides had already occurred, 
all prosecutions for incitement at the ICTY and ICTR would have resulted in 
completed genocides. Indeed, the ICTR concluded in Akayesu that ‘[n]ever-
theless, the Chamber is of the opinion that it cannot thereby be inferred that 
the intent of the drafters was not to punish unsuccessful acts of incitement. In 
light of the overall travaux, the Chamber holds the view that the drafters of the 
Convention simply decided not to speciﬁ cally mention that such a form of incite-
ment could be punished.’³⁶ However the ICTR felt compelled to determine 
whether incitement required a completed oﬀ ence. In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber 
held that a completed oﬀ ence was not necessary for an incitement conviction; 
the crime incited does not have to be committed.³⁷ Arguably, the issue was moot 
since the ICTR was conducting its work in the aftermath of the Rwandan geno-
cide. However, there is a more practical consequence for treating incitement as an 
inchoate oﬀ ence that does not require a completed genocide: it relieves the pros-
ecution of the burden of establishing a causal connection between the incitement 
and the completed genocide—an evidentiary obstacle that may be diﬃ  cult to 
achieve with anything other than circumstantial evidence. Indeed, in Nahimana 
the ICTR Trial Chamber explicitly held that the crime of incitement requires no 
causal link at all between the incitement and the genocide.³⁸ On a theoretical 
level, this is entirely consistent with the crime’s inchoate nature.
$ at being said, prosecutions for incitement to commit genocide at the ICTR 
are constrained by a number of legal requirements. (Although primarily a com-
mon law crime, the Trial Chamber in Akayesu found a civil law precedent in the 
form of provocation.³⁹) First, the incitement must be ‘direct’ since both the ICTR 
Statute and the Genocide Convention include this provision. According to the 
Trial Chamber in Akayesu, the directness prong requires that the incitement ‘spe-
ciﬁ cally provoke another to engage in a criminal act, and that more than mere 
³⁵ Nahimana, supra note 34, § 678.
³⁶ Judgment, Akayesu, Trial Chamber, 2 September 1998, § 561.
³⁷ Ibid., § 561.   ³⁸ Nahimana, supra note 15, § 1015.
³⁹ See Akayesu, supra note 36, § 555 (‘such a provocation, as deﬁ ned under Civil law, is made up 
of the same elements as direct and public incitement to commit genocide covered by Article 2 of the 
Statute, that is to say it is both direct and public.’). But see contra Sluiter and Zahar, supra note 31, 
at 168 (referring to this argument as ‘diﬃ  cult to follow’).
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vague or indirect suggestion goes to constitute direct incitement.’⁴⁰ $ is creates the 
somewhat complex standard that the incitement must be direct enough to provoke 
the criminal act, but does not need to actually provoke the criminal act (given the 
oﬀ ence’s inchoate nature)—an uncomfortable tension. Furthermore, according to 
the Trial Chamber, the question of directness ‘should be viewed in the light of its 
cultural and linguistic content’ and ‘a particular speech may be perceived as dir-
ect in one country, and not so in another, depending on the audience.‘⁴¹ Also, the 
Trial Chamber noted that incitement may be both direct and implicit at the same 
time, and speciﬁ cally quoted the drafting process of the Genocide Convention:
the Polish delegate observed that it was suﬃ  cient to play skillfully on mob psychology 
by casting suspicion on certain groups, by insinuating that they were responsible for eco-
nomic or other diﬃ  culties in order to create an atmosphere favourable to the perpetration 
of the crime.⁴² 
All that is required is that ‘the persons for whom the message was intended imme-
diately grasped the implication.’⁴³ Consequently, the required mens rea is that the 
defendant desires ‘to create by his actions a particular state of mind necessary to 
commit such a crime in the minds of the person(s) he is so engaging.’⁴⁴ $ erefore, 
the defendant must himself desire the destruction of the group and must seek to 
produce that intention in others as well.⁴⁵ $ ese legal conclusions have generated 
scholarly criticism.⁴⁶
As to the possible distinction between incitement to commit genocide and gar-
den-variety ‘hate speech’, the ICTR Appeals Chamber concluded in Nahimana 
that ‘[d]irect incitement to commit genocide . . . has to be more than a mere vague 
or indirect suggestion’⁴⁷ and ‘cannot be held accountable for hate speech that 
does not directly call for the commission of genocide.’⁴⁸ However, according 
to the Appeals Chamber, the ‘directness’ requirement does not entail that the 
incitement must be ‘explicit’ in its call for genocide. $ is view arguably departs 
from the precedent set at Nuremberg, where Streicher was convicted but Fritsche 
was not, precisely because the latter never directly called for the extermination of 
the Jews.⁴⁹ $ e Appeals Chamber dismissed this argument by noting that neither 
Streicher nor Fritsche were charged with direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide, since that speciﬁ c formulation of the crime (created by the Genocide 
Convention), did not yet exist under international law.⁵⁰
⁴⁰ Akayesu, supra note 36, § 557.
⁴¹ Ibid. $ is point was also reiterated in Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Trial Chamber, 1 
December 2003, § 853.
⁴² See Zahar and Sluiter, supra note 31, at 169 (noting that the position of the one Polish dele-
gate contradicts the ILC position that the incitement cannot be indirect).
⁴³ Akayesu, supra note 36, § 558.   ⁴⁴ Ibid.,§ 560.   ⁴⁵ Ibid., § 561.
⁴⁶ See especially Sluiter and Zahar, supra note 31, at 168 (‘We are entitled to read between the 
lines. $ is is Akayesu’s idea.’).
⁴⁷ Nahimana, supra note 34, § 692. ⁴⁸ Ibid., § 693. ⁴⁹ Ibid., § 702.
⁵⁰ For a criticism of this point, see Orentlicher, supra note 16, at 582 (concluding that, pace 
the ICTR, the Fritzsche judgment unquestionably stands for the proposition that incitement must 
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$ e incitement must also be ‘public’ according to both the ICTY and ICTR 
Statutes and the Genocide Convention. Implicitly, merely ‘private’ incitement is 
therefore not criminal, though charting the exact deﬁ nition of private is more 
diﬃ  cult than at ﬁ rst it would appear. Incitement by deﬁ nition involves commu-
nication to other parties, so the question is how many other parties must hear 
the incitement before it becomes ‘public’. In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber held 
that the public criterion is established by looking to ‘the place where the incite-
ment occurred and whether or not assistance was selective or limited.’⁵¹ $ e Trial 
Chamber cited the International Law Commission (ILC) for the proposition that 
‘public incitement is characterized by a call for criminal action to a number of 
individuals in a public place or to members of the general public at large by such 
means as the mass media, for example, radio or television.’⁵²
$ e ICTR applied this standard in several cases dealing directly with media 
executives responsible for broadcasting or distributing incendiary material. In 
Nahimana, oﬃ  cials at a Rwandan radio network were convicted of participating 
in the Rwandan genocide for allowing broadcasts that speciﬁ cally targeted Tutsi 
individuals.⁵³ $ e individuals were also convicted of genocide and conspiracy to 
commit genocide, though several convictions for genocide were later reversed by 
the Appeals Chamber, which let convictions for incitement stand. Much of the 
case turned on issues of language and the supposed meaning of the word Inyenzi 
as ‘cockroaches’—an inﬂ ammatory term from which genocidal intent might be 
inferred—and its relationship to the words Inkotanyi, which referred to the Tutsi 
rebels (a ﬁ ghting force) and the composite term Inkotanyi-Inyenzi (which draws 
on elements of both terms). Did the broadcasts in question urge elimination of 
enemy soldiers (arguably military propaganda, but not an international crime) 
or did it refer to an enemy ethnic group (thus constituting incitement to commit 
genocide)? $ e ICTR was persuaded that the call to action targeted an ethnic 
group, not just a ﬁ ghting force.⁵⁴
4.2 Conspiracy to Commit Genocide
Several ICTR Trial Chambers have convicted individuals of conspiracy to com-
mit genocide. Like incitement, conspiracy is an inchoate oﬀ ence, and a completed 
genocide need not occur in order for a conviction to obtain. $ is is consistent 
include a call to action or violence or persecution). Orentlicher refers to Nahimana as a ‘misreading’ 
of the Nuremberg cases.
⁵¹ Akayesu, supra note 36, § 556.
⁵² Ibid., citing Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 2(3)
(f); Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 51 UN GAOR Supp. 
(No. 10), at 26, UN Doc. A/51/10(1996).
⁵³ Hassan Ngeze and Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, two other executives, were also convicted.
⁵⁴ $ e linguistic issues are expertly and critically parsed in Zahar and Sluiter, supra note 31, 
at 186–90.
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with the common law understanding of conspiracy, i.e. that once the individ-
uals in question make the criminal agreement, the crime has in fact occurred.⁵⁵ 
Several scholars have noted that this distinguishes conspiracy to commit geno-
cide from conspiracy as a mode of liability as found in the doctrine of joint crim-
inal enterprise.⁵⁶
$ e ICTR noted in Musema that the travaux préparatoires to the Genocide 
Convention made clear that the rationale for penalizing conspiracy to commit 
genocide was ‘to ensure, in view of the serious nature of the crime of genocide, 
that the mere agreement to commit genocide should be punishable even if no 
preparatory act has taken place.’⁵⁷ Although the concept of conspiracy is far less 
accepted in the civil law, the ICTR accepted and applied basic principles of com-
mon law conspiracy on the theory that the drafters of the Genocide Conviction 
(and presumably by extension the drafters of the ICTY Statute, i.e. the Security 
Council), meant to codify the common law concept of conspiracy with full know-
ledge that the concept’s acceptance was not universal among all legal systems, but 
that its application in the case of genocide was warranted by the exigencies of the 
crime.⁵⁸ Consequently, the ICTR borrowed the common law deﬁ nition of con-
spiracy and eschewed the civil law version of complot.
As for the elements, the ICTR held that the mens rea for conspiracy to commit 
genocide is the dolus specialis of genocide (i.e. the intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group).⁵⁹ As for the material elem-
ent, the requirement is that the individual agree with one or more individuals to 
commit genocide, also known as a ‘concerted agreement to act’.⁶⁰ $ e element of 
acting ‘in concert’ is key because it distinguishes a conspiracy from mere ‘con-
scious parallelism’.⁶¹ $ e agreement need not be an express or formal one but may 
be inferred from the ‘concerted or coordinated action on the part of the group of 
individuals.’⁶² Consequently, a ‘tacit understanding of the criminal purpose is 
⁵⁵ See Robinson, supra note 5, at 644–5 (‘$ e underlying theory of conspiracy as an inchoate 
oﬀ ense is the same as that for attempt: It punishes an actor who intends to commit an oﬀ ense and 
externally manifests his or her willingness to carry out that intention. $ e agreement is an external-
ization of what, until then, may have been simply a though of the actor. $ e act of agreeing suggests 
that the actor has moved beyond mere fantasizing.’). See also US Model Penal Code, § 5.03.
⁵⁶ See G. Mettraux, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 253.
⁵⁷ See Judgment, Musema, Trial Chamber, 27 January 2000, § 185.
⁵⁸ See Cassese, supra note 9, at 228–9.
⁵⁹ Musema, supra note 57, § 192.
⁶⁰ Nahimana, supra note 34, § 894. See also Musema, supra note 57, §§ 189–91; Judgment, 
Ntagerura, Appeals Chamber, 7 July 2006, §§ 91–92; Kajelijeli, supra note 41, § 787 (‘$ e agree-
ment in a conspiracy is one that may be established by the prosecutor in no particular manner, but 
the evidence must show that an agreement had indeed been reached. $ e mere showing of a negoti-
ation in process will not do.’); Judgment, Niyitegeka, Trial Chamber, 16 May 2003, § 423.
⁶¹ Nahimana, supra note 34, § 897.
⁶² Nahimana, supra note 34, § 1045. Cf. Ntagerura, supra note 60, §§ 91–2. International tri-
bunals have engaged in a similar debate regarding the need for an express agreement for a joint 
criminal enterprise. See, e.g., K. Gustafson, ‘$ e Requirement of an “Express Agreement” for Joint 
Criminal Enterprise Liability’, 5 Journal Int’ l Criminal Justice (2007) 134.
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suﬃ  cient.’⁶³ In practice, the inference can be drawn from ‘coordinated actions by 
individuals who have a common purpose and are acting within a uniﬁ ed frame-
work’ such as a coalition where ‘those acting within the coalition are aware of its 
existence, their participation in it, and its role in furtherance of their common 
purpose.’⁶⁴
While some scholars were at ﬁ rst uncertain if the tribunals would consider 
conspiracy to commit genocide as an inchoate oﬀ ence,⁶⁵ the ICTR was quite 
clear in Musema that conspiracy is an inchoate oﬀ ence and that it ‘is punishable 
even if it fails to produce a result,’⁶⁶ an understanding of conspiracy that is con-
sistent with both civil and common law versions of the concept.⁶⁷ Somewhat 
curiously, however, the tribunal applied the doctrine of merger in this case, such 
that Musema could not be convicted of conspiracy to commit genocide if he was 
also convicted of genocide proper (because the former merged into the latter).⁶⁸ 
Although the civil law applies the doctrine of merger for its version of conspiracy, 
the common law rejects the merger doctrine for conspiracy, and prosecutors are 
fond of seeking convictions for both murder and conspiracy to commit murder 
when they can (though the issue is often moot if the defendant receives a life term 
for the top count of murder). $ e application of the merger doctrine in Musema 
is somewhat strange since it was the common law version of conspiracy that the 
Trial Chamber was explicitly applying.⁶⁹ $ e Trial Chamber relied on scholarly 
criticism of the common law rejection of merger by a treatise writer,⁷⁰ and by the 
fact that the trial Chamber should ‘adopt [] the deﬁ nition of conspiracy most 
favourable to Musema.’⁷¹ But it is unclear why this rule of construction applied 
to the doctrine of merger but did not apply to the choice between civil law and 
common law models, since the more restrictive civil law notion may very well 
have proved more helpful to the defence.⁷²
$ e Trial Chamber’s view was rejected by other trial chambers in several cases, 
which allowed convictions for both genocide and conspiracy to commit geno-
cide.⁷³ For example, in Nahimana, the Trial Chamber held that such cumulative 
convictions are appropriate since the material elements of conspiracy to commit 
genocide diﬀ er (by at least one element) from the material elements of genocide 
proper,⁷⁴ since conspiracy requires the existence of an agreement while genocide 
itself does not.⁷⁵ In Niyitegeka, the Trial Chamber convicted the defendant of 
both conspiracy to commit genocide and genocide itself, though it did so without 
⁶³ Nahimana, supra note 34, § 1045.   ⁶⁴ Ibid., § 1047.
⁶⁵ See Schabas, supra note 23, at 265.   ⁶⁶ Musema, supra note 57, § 194.
⁶⁷ Ibid., § 193.   ⁶⁸ Ibid., § 198.   ⁶⁹ Ibid., § 187.   
⁷⁰ Ibid., § 197.   ⁷¹ Ibid., § 198.
⁷² See, e.g., ibid., § 189 and the requirement of ‘material acts’ under civil law.
⁷³ See, e.g., Niyitegeka, Nahimnana and Kambanda, though the latter involved a guilty plea as 
opposed to a ﬁ nding after trial.
⁷⁴ Nahimana, supra note 15, § 1043.
⁷⁵ Some scholars have supported this view. See, e.g., Mettraux, supra note 56, 254.
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 explicit analysis of the merger doctrine.⁷⁶ Michel Bagaragaza was charged with 
both genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide, and at the time of writing, his 
trial is pending.⁷⁷ In Bagosora et al., four top military oﬃ  cials were acquitted by 
the Trial Chamber of conspiracy to commit genocide, though three of the oﬃ  cials 
were convicted on other charges.⁷⁸ $ e prosecution had alleged a series of con-
spiratorial acts between 1990 and 1994 that led up to the genocide, including the 
creation of a commission that deﬁ ned the enemy with reference to the Tutsi ethni-
city, Bagosora’s comment about the coming ‘apocalypse’, a reference in one letter 
to a ‘Machiavellian plan’, the drafting of a target list, and the arming of the civil-
ian militia.⁷⁹ $ e Trial Chamber found insuﬃ  cient evidence of genocidal intent 
to sustain a conviction and concluded that much of the evidence was consistent 
with preparations for war, not genocide directed against the Tutsi population. $ e 
Chamber rejected as not credible the evidence regarding the alleged target list and 
the comments of a coming apocalypse and a Machiavellian plan.⁸⁰
5. Incitement and Conspiracy under the ICC Statute
$ e ICC Statute departs signiﬁ cantly from the strategy of the ICTY and ICTR 
Statutes. Instead of borrowing directly from the list of genocide oﬀ ences contained 
in the Genocide Convention, the ICC Statute eschews this strategy in favour of 
relying on general principles regarding individual liability that will apply to all 
international crimes covered by the Statute, not just for genocide. One of the 
principle beneﬁ ts of this approach is its coherence; it prevents overlapping liabil-
ity generated by the special genocide crimes contained in the ICTY and the ICTR 
Statutes and the individual liability provisions of those Statutes. However, the 
⁷⁶ Niyitegeka, supra note 60, § 502.
⁷⁷ $ e prosecution move to refer his case for trial before a domestic court in Norway, a request 
that was not opposed in principle by the defence, but the motion was rejected by the ICTR. See 
Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Referral to the Kingdom of Norway, Bagaragaza, Trial 
Chamber III, 19 May 2006 (‘$ e Prosecution further states that, even if those requirements are 
met, strong public policy reasons favour the involvement of other countries in the prosecution of 
the Accused because it would be a manner of educating people in other countries on the lessons to 
be learned from the Rwandan genocide and would promote the development of ideas to prevent 
future similar tragedies.’). $ e Trial Chamber denied the referral because Norway does not have 
a domestic penal law against genocide, and the government in Norway planned to try the defend-
ant under universal jurisdiction ‘as an accessory to homicide or negligent homicide, for which the 
maximum sentence is 21 years imprisonment.’ $ e prosecution subsequently successfully moved to 
have the case referred to a domestic court in the Netherlands. See Decision on Prosecutor’s Request 
for Referral of the Indictment to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Bagaragaza, Trial Chamber, 13 
April 2007. But the referral was subsequently revoked by the Trial Chamber after a district court in 
the Netherlands rejected domestic jurisdiction in a similar case.
⁷⁸ See Prosecutor v. ) éoneste Bagosora et al., Trial Chamber, 18 December 2008. As of February 
2009, the written version of the judgment had not been ﬁ led. $ e Trial Chamber issued a written 
summary at the time it issued the oral judgment.
⁷⁹ Ibid.   ⁸⁰ Ibid.
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conversion is far from complete, since the ICC Statute still includes, in Article 25 
(a section nominally devoted to general principles of individual criminal respon-
sibility), a speciﬁ c provision only applicable to genocide that penalizes ‘directly 
and publicly incit[ing] others to commit the crime [of genocide]’.⁸¹ Other general 
principles that would apply to genocide also are covered by Article 25, including 
aiding and abetting (Article 25(3)(c)), attempt (Article 25(3)(f)), and common 
purpose liability (Article 25(3)(d)). $ e latter provision covers at least some of the 
same ground as conspiracy liability for genocide, though the provision establishes 
a mode of liability, not a separate inchoate oﬀ ence.⁸²
Conspiracy as a substantive oﬀ ence is excluded from the ICC Statute, for 
all oﬀ ences, because the drafters of the Statute could not agree to its inclusion. 
Representatives from civil law jurisdictions announced their opposition to it, 
echoing essentially the same concerns raised from civil law jurists at Nuremberg, 
which rejected conspiracy as a crime in all cases except aggression. Although 
individual liability was established by Article 25(3)(d), which creates a form 
of individual liability for collective criminal endeavors,⁸³ it is neither inchoate 
(since it requires the commission or attempted commission of an oﬀ ence) nor an 
oﬀ ence (it is a mode of liability). Schabas concludes that although Article 25(3)(d) 
embodies a civil law approach (requiring a completed oﬀ ence), ‘there was no real 
debate on this point’ and that ‘the inconsistency with the terms of the Genocide 
Convention would appear to be inadvertent.’⁸⁴ $ is is diﬃ  cult to countenance, 
especially since the parties explicitly drafted a provision to retain incitement as 
an inchoate oﬀ ence.⁸⁵ In any event, conspiracy to commit genocide is a crime 
under the Genocide Convention and the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, but it is not 
a crime under the ICC Statute. Incredibly, Schabas attributes the discrepancy to 
‘an oversight of exhausted drafters,’ which implies some degree of inadvertence or 
mistake when the Rome diplomatic conference transferred the genocide oﬀ ences 
from the Convention to the Rome ICC Statute.⁸⁶ Other scholars have made much 
more of this shift. Fletcher, for one, concludes that the ICC Statute is evidence 
of a ‘calmer moment of history’ when the passions created by the Rwandan and 
⁸¹ ICC statute, Art. 25(3)(e).
⁸² See Schabas, supra note 2, at 155 (‘$ is result was achieved only partially.’).
⁸³ $ e exact relationship between Article 25(3)(d), the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise, and 
the common law concept of conspiracy is a matter of some controversy. Compare Cassese, supra 
note 9, at 202 and 213, with Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction—
Joint Criminal Enterprise, Milutinović, Šainović and Ojdanić, Appeals Chamber, 21 May 2003, 
§ 23 (JCE requires agreement plus a showing of action in furtherance of that agreement). See 
also A. Zahar, ‘Commentary: Prosecutor v. Krnojelac’, 14 Annotated Leading Cases of International 
Criminal Tribunals, 842.
⁸⁴ Schabas, supra note 2, at 155, citing Committee of the Whole, ‘Working Group on General 
Principles of Criminal Law,’ UN Doc. A/ CONF.183/C.A./WGGP/L.3 (18 June 1998). $ e cit-
ation on this point gives no evidence either way and is simply the text of the proposed provision.
⁸⁵ See K. Ambos, ‘Article 25 Individual Criminal Responsibility’, in Triﬀ terer, supra note 2, 
743, at 760.
⁸⁶ See Schabas, supra note 23, at 264.
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the Yugoslavian tragedies had cooled and resulted in a more defensible statute 
from the perspective of criminal law theory.⁸⁷ For Fletcher, the ICTY and ICTR 
Statutes are exceptions in this regard and their conspiracy provisions ‘reﬂ ect the 
afterglow of a dying concept.’⁸⁸ In contrast, Cassese views the diﬀ erence between 
Article 6 of the ICC Statute and the ICTY and ICTR Statutes as embodying a 
ﬁ ssure between ‘customary international law’ and the ICC Statute.⁸⁹ In other 
words, the view here is that customary international law criminalizes conspiracy 
to commit genocide, while the ICC Statute does not.
$ is view requires some critical reﬂ ection. First, it is unclear how exactly the 
prohibition contained in the ICTY or ICTR Statutes can give rise to a norm of cus-
tomary international law. First, customary law is based entirely on state practice 
and opinio juris.⁹⁰ $ e ICTY and ICTR Statutes are indeed binding pronounce-
ments of international law (issued from the Security Council under its Chapter 
VII authority), but these are hardly a form of customary international law. Indeed, 
the issuance of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes by the Security Council cannot 
meet the requirement of a widespread practice of states suﬃ  cient to establish a 
norm.⁹¹ Furthermore, the prosecutions at the ICTR for conspiracy to commit 
genocide,⁹² cannot be considered evidence of an emerging norm of customary 
international law, because these decisions were announced by an international ad 
hoc Tribunal whose actions cannot be attributed to a speciﬁ c state (or group of 
states).⁹³ It is true that the Genocide Convention itself may be one source of state 
practice, given that it was signed and ratiﬁ ed by a large number of states (though 
the US declined to ratify it until 1988). Or, the Genocide Convention might 
be thought to embody customary international law, though if this is the case, it 
would appear that the Rome Statute indicates a clear desire on the part of a large 
number of states to alter the customary norm.⁹⁴ Also, the Genocide Convention 
is more properly described as a case of treaty (i.e. positive) law, not customary law, 
in which case it is just one treaty whose value as a source of law is to be balanced on 
the one hand with another multilateral treaty, the Rome Statute, which expressly 
excludes liability for conspiracy to commit genocide. In cases of treaty-based law, 
⁸⁷ See Fletcher, supra note 3, at 12.   ⁸⁸ Ibid.
⁸⁹ See A. Cassese, ‘Jurisdiction ratione materiae—Genocide’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and 
J.R.W.D. Jones (eds), ) e Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002) 335, at 347.
⁹⁰ See International Law Association, Committee on Formation of Customary (General) 
International Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary 
International Law (2000); H.W.A. $ irlway, International Customary Law and Codiﬁ cation 
(Leiden, Sijthoﬀ , 1972), 47.
⁹¹ M. Bos, A Methodology of International Law (Amsterdam, New York: North-Holland, 1984), 
234 (state practice must achieve ‘virtual uniformity’).
⁹² See, e.g., Musema, supra note 35, § 185.
⁹³ See generally Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary 
International Law, supra note 90, at 18 (‘Although international courts and tribunals ultimately 
derive their authority from States, it is not appropriate to regard their decisions as a form of State 
practice.’).
⁹⁴ To date, 108 states are parties to the treaty.
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if one treaty conﬂ icts with another, one looks to the more recent treaty over the 
older one.⁹⁵ Consequently, it would appear that the Rome Statute represented a 
desire (whether or not it was explicitly notarized in the travaux préparatoires) on 
the part of state parties to change the applicable law regarding conspiracy to com-
mit genocide. Indeed, unless one adopts some view similar to this, one is left with 
the possibility that in failing to penalize conspiracy to commit genocide, the par-
ties to the Rome Statute were in breach of their obligations under the Genocide 
Convention. $ at cannot be the correct analysis.
In any event, it is unclear what practical consequences might ﬂ ow from a 
putative norm of ‘customary international law’ prohibiting conspiracy to com-
mit genocide. All future prosecutions before the ICC are by deﬁ nition governed 
by the ICC Statute. Although the international community might still in the 
future resort to ad hoc Tribunals in speciﬁ c circumstances, we have long since 
past the time when an international criminal tribunal might apply customary 
international law in the total absence of a speciﬁ c penal statute that governs its 
activities. Indeed, the whole trend in both domestic and international criminal 
law has been the rejection of prosecution for common law crimes in favor of 
legislatively enacted penal statutes and prosecutions that conform to the prin-
ciple of legality and nullem crimin sine lege (criminal oﬀ ences must be provided 
for by law). Of course, it might be possible to establish a customary norm if 
there were suﬃ  cient evidence of domestic prosecutions for conspiracy to com-
mit genocide, although as the following section makes clear, such prosecutions 
are rare.
A better way of expressing the tension between the ICTY and ICTR Statutes 
and Article 6 of the ICC Statute is that the Security Council considers conspir-
acy to commit genocide to be an international crime, though the drafters of the 
ICC do not. At the very least, the Security Council believed this to be the case 
for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and it is unclear how it could be anything other than 
a general principle applicable in other regions (and at other times) as well. It is 
genuinely unclear how to resolve this tension. While a Security Council pro-
nouncement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is binding and arguably hier-
archically superior over any voluntary treaty commitment,⁹⁶ the whole point of 
the ICC Statute was the voluntary creation of an international penal code for the 
new Court to apply. No scholar has explicitly and successfully resolved this prob-
lem of conﬂ icting authority.
⁹⁵ See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, art. 30(3) and 
30(4) (between states that are parties to both treaties, the ‘the earlier treaty applies only to the extent 
that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty’). Although the Vienna Convention 
entered into force in 1969, and the Genocide Convention was concluded more than two decades 
earlier, the Vienna Convention rule embodies customary norms of treaty interpretation.
⁹⁶ See D. Shelton, ‘Normative Hierarchy in International Law’, 100 American Journal of Int’ l 
Law (2006) 291.
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6. Domestic Prosecutions and Legislation
Although there have been a few domestic prosecutions for genocide, there have 
been no known domestic prosecutions for incitement or conspiracy to com-
mit genocide. But several states have enacted domestic legislation that covers 
conspiracy to commit genocide and incitement to commit genocide, consistent 
with their obligations under the Genocide Convention. For example, Austria’s 
criminal code penalizes conspiracy to commit genocide, which carries a ten-
year prison term.⁹⁷ $ e Canadian War Crimes Act makes conspiracy to com-
mit genocide within or outside of Canada an oﬀ ence, though incitement is not 
covered under that law.⁹⁸ In the US, federal law makes directly and publicly 
inciting another to commit genocide to be unlawful punishable by a ﬁ ne of 
$500,000 or ﬁ ve years in prison or both, though the jurisdiction is limited 
by the principles of territoriality or active nationality.⁹⁹ $ e US provision on 
genocide includes no mention of conspiracy, but presumably the general federal 
statute on conspiracy applies to this criminal provision as well.¹⁰⁰ $ e Italian 
law on genocide includes a speciﬁ c provision on conspiracy to commit genocide 
that yields one to six years in prison,¹⁰¹ while incitement carries a term of three 
to twelve years.¹⁰² In 1996, the Swiss government charged a Rwandan national 
named Niyonteze with instigation to commit homicide and other oﬀ ences 
related to the Rwandan genocide, but he could not be charged with genocide 
or incitement to commit genocide because Switzerland had not yet enacted 
domestic legislation criminalizing genocide in accordance with the Genocide 
Convention.¹⁰³
In another well-publicized case, Canadian oﬃ  cials attempted to have 
Mugesera removed from Canada for his contribution to the Rwandan genocide 
for a famous speech delivered in 1996.¹⁰⁴ $ e government argued that it consti-
tuted incitement to commit genocide and that Mugesera had deliberately failed 
⁹⁷ Strafgesetzbuch, section 321.   ⁹⁸ Bill C-19.
⁹⁹ 18 U.S.C. § 1091. In cases of genocide proper ‘where death results’, the statute authorizes 
the death penalty, or a life sentence and a $1 million ﬁ ne. In cases where death does not result, the 
statute allows a $1 million ﬁ ne or a prison term of 20 years or both.
¹⁰⁰ 18 U.S.C. § 371.
¹⁰¹ Prevention and Repression of the Crime of Genocide, Art. 7.
¹⁰² Prevention and Repression of the Crime of Genocide, Art. 8.
¹⁰³ For a description of the case, see W.A. Schabas, ‘National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute 
Genocide, the “Crime of Crimes”‘, 1 Journal Int’ l Criminal Justice (2003), 39, at 47–9. On appeal, 
the convictions for homicide, attempted homicide, and instigating homicide were reversed, but 
convictions were allowed for serious violations of the Geneva Conventions. On appeal again to the 
Tribunal militaire de cassation, the court upheld the convictions based on the Geneva Convention 
because there was a suﬃ  cient nexus between the defendant’s criminal acts and the armed conﬂ ict. 
See N and Military Prosecutor of the Military Tribunal of First instance 2 v. Military Appeals 
Tribunal 1A, Cassation Judgment, ILDC 349 (CH 2001).
¹⁰⁴ Ibid., at 50 for a description of the underlying facts.
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to disclose his participation in his paperwork when he immigrated to Canada. 
A federal court overturned the ﬁ nding that he was under a duty to disclose this 
information. In 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada held that Mugesera could 
be deported.¹⁰⁵ Speciﬁ cally, the court held that ‘the Minister does not need to 
establish a direct causal link between the speech and any acts of murder or vio-
lence,’ thus conﬁ rming the inchoate nature of the oﬀ ence. Furthermore, the 
court gave a gloss on the ‘direct and public’ standard: ‘In order for a speech to 
constitute a direct incitement, the words used must be clear enough to be imme-
diately understood by the intended audience.’ Applied to the facts of the case, 
the court concluded that Mugesera’s message was ‘delivered in a public place at 
a public meeting and would have been clearly understood by the audience.’ As 
for the required mens rea, the Supreme Court of Canada held that ‘[t]he guilty 
mind is an intent to directly prompt or provoke another to commit genocide. $ e 
person who incites must also have the speciﬁ c intent to commit genocide. Intent 
can be inferred from the circumstances.’ Applying this standard to Mugesera’s 
speech, the court concluded that Mugesera ‘was aware that ethnic massacres were 
taking place when he advocated the killing of members of an identiﬁ able group 
distinguished by ethnic origin with intent to destroy it in part.’ Although the 
court was interpreting the Canadian Criminal Code,¹⁰⁶ it is important to note 
that the decision was a review of an immigration deportation order, not a crim-
inal prosecution.
7. Concluding Remarks
Although the ICTR has helped develop a nascent jurisprudence of conspiracy to 
commit genocide, the future of this criminal category is uncertain. $ e crime’s 
exclusion from the statute of the permanent ICC will no doubt hamper judicial 
development of the doctrine. Future ad hoc Tribunals might apply the concept, 
as might domestic courts applying either national criminal law or international 
law. Only time will tell whether conspiracy to commit genocide is indeed the 
¹⁰⁵ Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, 2005 
S.C.C. 40, available at: http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2005/2005scc40/2005scc40.html (last 
visited 10 January 2009).
¹⁰⁶ Criminal Code of Canada, section 318 (‘Every one who advocates or promotes genocide is 
guilty of an indictable oﬀ ence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ﬁ ve years.’). See 
also section 319(1) (public incitement of hatred) (‘Every one who, by communicating statements 
in any public place, incites hatred against any identiﬁ able group where such incitement is likely to 
lead to a breach of the peace is guilty of (a) an indictable oﬀ ence and is liable to imprisonment for 
a term not exceeding two years; or (b) an oﬀ ence punishable on summary conviction.’); section 
319(2) (wilful promotion of hatred) (‘Every one who, by communicating statements, other than 
in private conversation, wilfully promotes hatred against any identiﬁ able group is guilty of (a) 
an indictable oﬀ ence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or (b) an 
oﬀ ence punishable on summary conviction.’).
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‘afterglow of a dying concept’ or a continuing and viable strategy for stopping and 
prosecuting genocidal plans. Incitement raises its own distinct issues regarding 
the manner in which the international judiciary should penalize verbal conduct. 
However, the fact that the Rome Statute includes an explicit provision penalizing 
incitement to commit genocide means that the ICC will have the opportunity to 
develop the jurisprudence of incitement even if conspiracy to commit genocide 
remains out of their grasp.
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State Responsibility for Conspiracy, 
Incitement, and Attempt to Commit Genocide
Jens David Ohlin
1. Introduction
 e lack of case law or actual adjudication presents an impediment to a com-
plete scholarly assessment of the possibility of state responsibility for conspiracy, 
incitement, and attempt to genocide. Nonetheless, it is possible to determine the 
outer contours of these notions without reference to their direct application in the 
case law. As a matter of methodology, one can harness the already well-developed 
understanding of the category of attempts from the criminal law, the concept 
of state responsibility under international law, and our doctrinal understanding 
of individual responsibility for conspiracy and incitement to commit genocide. 
Taken together, one can telegraph the outer contours of state responsibility for 
these crimes and how they might be applied in the future by the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ).  e discussion will, of necessity, remain speculate. A full 
analysis follows.
2. State Responsibility for Conspiracy and Incitement 
to Commit Genocide
No court or competent international authority has ever held a state responsible for 
conspiracy or incitement to commit genocide. However, the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter referred to as 
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the ‘Genocide Convention’ or ‘Convention’) clearly anticipates state  responsibility 
for such acts.¹ In the only direct case dealing with state responsibility for genocide, 
the ICJ in the Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and 
Montenegro) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Bosnian Genocide case’) considered 
the issue and declined to hold Serbia responsible for conspiracy, incitement, or 
complicity.² However, the court’s rationale stemmed from the same rationale for 
its failure to hold Serbia responsible for genocide proper: i.e., insuﬃ  cient evi-
dence that the relevant actors were organs of the Serbian government or acting 
under their direct control.³ Consequently, the court’s analysis suggests that in 
cases where such evidence is present, state responsibility for conspiracy or incite-
ment is possible.
Speciﬁ cally, the Court noted that:
It has not been proved that organs of the FRY, or persons acting on the instructions or 
under the eﬀ ective control of that State, committed acts that could be characterized as 
‘[c]onspiracy to commit genocide’ (Art. III, para. (b)), or as ‘[d]irect and public incite-
ment to commit genocide’ (Art. III, para. (c)), if one considers, as is appropriate, only the 
events in Srebrenica.’⁴
As regarding incitement, the court concluded that it was not proven ‘that such 
organs or persons incited the commission of acts of genocide anywhere else on 
the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’⁵
 e Court oﬀ ered no other analysis, preferring instead to rely on its previous 
holding that imputation to Serbia of genocidal acts by soldiers on the ground 
was impossible without more direct evidence.⁶ However, the Court did suggest a 
standard that must be met before evidence of incitement would be accepted: ‘In 
this respect, the Court must only accept precise and incontrovertible evidence, of 
which there is clearly none.’⁷ It would appear that the Court was suggesting that 
state responsibility would require clear evidence such as speciﬁ c speeches or oﬃ  -
cial documents, authored by a duly authorized government oﬃ  cial, speciﬁ cally 
inciting the citizenry to commit genocidal acts. If such facts were presented to the 
ICJ in a future case, it would appear that the court would be hard pressed to deny 
state responsibility for incitement.⁸
¹ See generally, Articles I and V of the Genocide Convention. See also A. Cassese, International 
Law (2nd edn., Oxford University Press, 2005), 443 (Convention considers genocide ‘an interna-
tional delinquency entailing the responsibility of the State whose authorities engage in, or other-
wise participate in the commission of genocide’).
² ICJ, Judgment, Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 26 
February 2007, ICJ Reports (2007) (hereinafter: ICJ 2007 Judgment), § 417.
³ ICJ 2007 Judgment, cit. supra note 2, , § 417.   ⁴ Ibid., § 417.
⁵ Ibid.   ⁶ Ibid., §§ 385–412.   ⁷ Ibid, § 417.
⁸  e Court was applying the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on State 
Responsibility. See ICJ 2007 Judgment, cit. supra note 2, § 414.
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 e conclusion reached by the Court, however, was heavily criticized by 
 scholars, as well as the one dissenting judge in the case, Judge Al-Khasawneh.⁹ 
Judge Al- Khasawneh referred in his dissent to ‘massive and compelling evidence’ 
of Serbian governmental involvement. Furthermore, he speciﬁ cally noted that 
had the majority employed a diﬀ erent methodology for considering the evidence, 
then Serbian responsibility for conspiracy or incitement to commit genocide 
would have been established:
 is implies that the charge that genocide took place also in other parts of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and that the FRY was responsible not only for its failure to prevent genocide 
but for being actively involved in it either as a principal or alternatively as an accomplice 
or by way of conspiracy or incitement would in all probability have been proven had the 
Court not adopted the methodology discussed below.¹⁰
As for methodology, Al-Khasawneh noted that the Court only received redacted 
copies of the most crucial documents and did not demand unredacted copies 
of the material. Furthermore, the Court was free to draw an adverse inference 
from Serbia’s failure to provide the information, in accordance with Article 49 of 
the ICJ Statute, even to the point of assuming that the documents were totally 
adverse to the position taken by the Serbian government.¹¹  e dissent also 
faulted the majority for its application of the eﬀ ective-control test, and that the 
court should have recognized that, as the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamber did in Čelebići, that:
the ‘overall control’ test could thus be fulﬁ lled even if the armed forces acting on behalf 
of the ‘controlling state’ had autonomous choices of means and tactics although partici-
pating in a common strategy along with the controlling State.¹²
According to the dissent, this view is also supported by the ICTY Tadić opin-
ion, in which the Appeals Chamber believed that it was applying basic principles 
of international law regarding attribution of state responsibility (not just rules 
of international humanitarian law).¹³ Had these methodological points been 
addressed, the Court might have found suﬃ  cient evidence of state responsibility 
for conspiracy and incitement to commit genocide.
⁹ See Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, § 3.
¹⁰ See Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, § 31.
¹¹ Al-Khasawneh argued that this would have been consistent with the Corfu Channel Case where 
the court noted that ‘[b]y reason of this exclusive control, the other State, the victim of a breach of 
international law, is often unable to furnish direct proof of facts giving rise to responsibility. Such a 
State should be allowed a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence.  is 
indirect evidence is admitted in all systems of law, and its use is recognized by international decisions.’ 
See Judgment, Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), ICJ Reports (1949), 18, cited in the ICJ 
2007 Judgment, cit. supra note 2, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, § 35.
¹² ICTY, Judgment, Prosecutor v. Delalić, Appeals Chamber, 20 February 2001, § 47.
¹³ See Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, § 38, citing ICTY Judgment, 
Prosecutor v. Tadić, 15 July 1999, Appeals Chamber, § 98 (whether the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) was responsible for the acts of the VRS (Army of the Republika Srpska) under 
rules of attribution under international law).
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3. State Responsibility for Attempt to 
Commit Genocide
 ere is little positive law regarding state responsibility for attempted genocide. 
Given that, according to the interpretation of the ICJ, the Genocide Convention 
contemplates state responsibility for genocide and that punishable acts of geno-
cide are deﬁ ned under Article III to include attempts, there is no reason that state 
responsibility would not attach in cases of attempted genocide. However, as in 
individual responsibility for attempt to commit genocide, there is some confusion 
over the exact contours of the ‘attempt’ element of the crime. Under criminal law, 
attempts generally require an intention to commit the crime, an act requirement, 
and incompleteness that stems from an outside factor (as opposed to a defendant’s 
abandonment of the crime, which is therefore a defence). However, the crime of 
genocide already includes an aspect of incompleteness, since the crime does not 
require the actual destruction of a protected group, but merely requires one of the 
predicate acts contained in Article II of the Convention (e.g. killing members of 
the group, etc.) performed ‘with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.’ So it is unclear whether ‘attempt 
to commit genocide’ involves a completed predicate act that fails to generate a 
successful genocide or whether it involves a frustrated predicate act, such as an 
attempted killing performed with genocidal intent.  e former would appear to 
be unnecessary as a separate crime because it would already be covered by crime 
of genocide proper, while the latter interpretation might stand in some tension 
with the plain meaning of Article II, which requires completed acts such as a 
(presumably completed) ‘killing’.  e Genocide Convention speciﬁ cally prohib-
its attempt to commit genocide in Article III(d), but includes no deﬁ nition.¹⁴
 e ICJ decision in the Bosnian Genocide case did not directly address the crime 
of attempted genocide. In its original submissions to the court, Bosnia asked the 
ICJ to declare Serbia responsible for, inter alia:
destroying in part, and attempting to destroy in whole, national, ethnical or religious groups 
within the, but not limited to the, territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
including in particular the Muslim population . . . ¹⁵
 e second count also included a reference to attempts:
 at the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has violated and is 
violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
by conspiring to commit genocide, by complicity in genocide, by attempting to commit 
genocide and by incitement to commit genocide¹⁶
¹⁴ For a complete analysis of this issue, see Chapter 17 of this volume.
¹⁵ ICJ 2007 Judgment, supra note 2, § 65 (emphasis added).   ¹⁶ Ibid.
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Strangely, though, Bosnia’s ﬁ nal submissions in the case included no mention of 
attempt whatsoever, for no apparent reason.¹⁷ Consequently, the court refused to 
directly resolve the question.
Nonetheless, the Court’s conclusions of law may be scrutinized to shed light 
on this issue. First, the allegations in the ﬁ nal submissions still included aspects 
of attempt. For example, the court noted:
Article II (c) of the Genocide Convention concerns the deliberate inﬂ iction on the group 
of conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part. 
Under this heading, the Applicant ﬁ rst points to an alleged policy by the Bosnian Serb 
forces to encircle civilians of the protected group in villages, towns or entire regions and 
to subsequently shell those areas and cut oﬀ  all supplies in order to starve the population. 
Secondly, the Applicant claims that Bosnian Serb forces attempted to deport and expel 
the protected group from the areas which those forces occupied. Finally, the Applicant 
alleges that Bosnian Serb forces attempted to eradicate all traces of the culture of the pro-
tected group through the destruction of historical, religious and cultural property.¹⁸
Although not attempt to commit genocide per se, this is a perfect example of con-
ceptual confusion over whether attempt to commit genocide involves an incom-
plete predicate act or an incomplete genocide.  e above allegation that Bosnian 
Serb forces ‘attempted to deport and expel the protected group from the areas’ 
appears to suggest an incomplete predicate act. However, in the very next sen-
tence, the Court shifts to a Serb attempt ‘to eradicate all traces of the culture of 
the protected group’, which suggests not an incomplete predicate act but a larger 
incomplete program of cultural genocide. Both interpretations of the crime of 
attempt appear in close succession in this single paragraph, without the Court’s 
apparent awareness of the possible theoretical implications for either criminal 
law theory of the practical implications for developing the correct elements of the 
charge in order to determine liability.
In evaluating this legal allegation of so-called ‘cultural genocide’, the con-
cept of attempt ﬁ gured prominently in the court’s analysis.  e ICJ noted that 
Bosnia:
claims that throughout the conﬂ ict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serb forces engaged in 
the deliberate destruction of historical, religious and cultural property of the protected 
group in “an attempt to wipe out the traces of their very existence”.¹⁹
¹⁷ Ibid., § 416 (‘ e Court now comes to the second of the questions set out in paragraph 379 
above, namely, that relating to the Respondent’s possible responsibility on the ground of one of the 
acts related to genocide enumerated in Article III of the Convention.  ese are: conspiracy to com-
mit genocide (Art. III, para. (b)), direct and public incitement to commit genocide (Art. III, para. 
(c)), attempt to commit genocide (Art. III, para. (d))—though no claim is made under this head in 
the Applicant’s ﬁ nal submissions in the present case—and complicity in genocide (Art. III, para. 
(e)). For the reasons already stated (paragraph 380 above), the Court must make a ﬁ nding on this 
matter inasmuch as it has replied in the negative to the previous question, that of the Respondent’s 
responsibility in the commission of the genocide itself.’).
¹⁸ ICJ 2007 Judgment, supra note 2, § 320.   ¹⁹ Ibid., § 335.
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However, the court concluded that cultural genocide was not covered by the 
express terms of the Genocide Convention because:
the destruction of historical, cultural and religious heritage cannot be considered to con-
stitute the deliberate inﬂ iction of conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical 
destruction of the group. Although such destruction may be highly signiﬁ cant inasmuch 
as it is directed to the elimination of all traces of the cultural or religious presence of a 
group, and contrary to other legal norms, it does not fall within the categories of acts of 
genocide set out in Article II of the Convention.²⁰
 e Court also noted that the concept was not supported by the preparatory work 
of the Convention.²¹
 at being said, the ICJ did explicitly declare that state responsibility for 
attempted genocide was not possible in situations where the state was already 
responsible for a completed genocide. It is unclear why the court felt entitled to 
make this doctrinal pronouncement, since it explicitly declined to consider Bosnia’s 
original allegation that Serbia should be held responsible under the Genocide 
Convention for attempt to commit genocide. Nonetheless, the ICJ concluded that 
it would be ‘untenable both logically and legally’ to hold a state responsible for both 
genocide and one of the other modes, including attempt, complicity, or conspir-
acy to commit genocide.  is conclusion is consistent with the criminal law doc-
trine of merger, whereby crimes of attempt merge into their completed analogues.²² 
(Otherwise, every defendant convicted of a completed oﬀ ence would be guilty, by 
deﬁ nition, of the attempted oﬀ ence). Although this analysis seems obvious, it does 
reveal something crucial: that the ICJ regards attempted genocide as dealing with 
the overall crime, not the underlying criminal act. It is, for example, entirely pos-
sible to imagine a situation where an overall genocide occurs, but of the underlying 
acts, some are completed (leading to the overall genocide) while others are not, and 
the legal question stemming from such a scenario would be which of the underlying 
actions give rise to state responsibility. But, on the contrary, the ICJ appears to have 
understood attempt to commit genocide as applying only to those situations where 
an overall genocide never happens. Unfortunately, the court never listed the elem-
ents of attempt to commit genocide and how they diﬀ er from genocide proper.
4. Concluding Remarks
Now that the ICJ has made its ﬁ rst determinations regarding state responsibility 
for genocide under the Convention, it is highly likely that more cases will follow. 
²⁰ Ibid., § 344.
²¹ Ibid., citing Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Forty-eighth Session, 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1996), Vol. II, Part Two, pp 45–6, § 12.
²²  at being the case, many common law jurisdictions reject the doctrine of merger for con-
spiracy, thus allowing defendants to be charged both with a completed oﬀ ence and conspiracy to 
commit the oﬀ ence, and to received consecutive sentences for each.
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It only took sixty years for this to happen. Future litigants before the court are 
now likely to pursue as many legal theories as possible to increase their likeli-
hood of success; one can therefore hope that the issues of attempt, conspiracy, 
and incitement to commit genocide will be explicitly litigated before the ICJ and 
that the Court will oﬀ er a deﬁ nitive and clear pronouncement on these issues. 
 e question for the next century of international law is whether the Court might 
hold a state responsible for attempt, conspiracy, or incitement to commit gen-
ocide, even in the absence of liability for genocide proper.  e very possibility 
raises the stakes for international legal disputes.
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